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This paper seeks to identify and chart the global dimensions of the political conflict and civil 
war in Sri Lanka.  The global dimensions are visualised in  terms of the ways in which the 
dynamic of the conflict has been embedded within two parallel and closely inter-dependent 
trajectories relating to the global economy and global politics. The conflict, which has taken 
various forms since the inception of the separatist movement in the early 1970s, spans a 
number of distinct historical phases that straddle important external political, economic and 
cultural changes, including the end of the cold war, the rise of a global liberal economic 
order, and the effects of the emerging global “war on terrorism” – all of which are playing 
an important role in the dynamics of the conflict.  In the face of the extended stalemate that 
has characterised the internal political and military dynamics of the conflict, this paper 
argues that the politics of the war/peace process can be better understood by situating them 
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For almost two decades from 1983-2002, Sri Lanka was embroiled in a bitter, “no mercy” 
civil war that claimed a devastating human toll, and that comprised a number of different 
phases and even different protagonists.
1  Some 60,000 to 70,000 people are estimated to have 
died since July 1983, when a simmering insurgency campaign in the north escalated 
traumatically into war.  In the late-1990s, almost a million people, amounting to one-third of 
the total population of the north-east were living as internally displaced persons (IDP’s),
2 
while one-quarter of the total Sri Lankan Tamil population had left the country, mostly as a 
direct or indirect result of the war.  A further large number of people estimated as at least 
10,000 and sometimes as high as 60,000, are estimated dead or disappeared in a separate, but 
indirectly related insurgency in the south between 1987-1990.
3 
 
But despite the enormous toll inflicted on all segments of Sri Lankan society and the complex 
and unexpected directions that the extended war and peace processes have taken, the 
domestic political and military dynamics of the conflict remained surprisingly little changed 
on the eve of the December 2001 ceasefire as it was at the onset of the conflict in July 1983.  
In political terms, the main insurgent organisation, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) has been fighting for the recognition of the island’s Tamil-dominated north and 
coastal east, as a distinct Tamil homeland or “Tamil Eelam”.
4  Successive governments in 
Colombo, meanwhile have rejected this outright and have been prepared to consider little 
more than varying degrees of regional devolution.  In the course of the prolonged and 
overlapping processes of war and peace, neither side appeared to have made any substantial 
compromise on their respective political positions. 
 
For example, in April 2002, in the run-up to formal peace negotiations, LTTE leader 
V.Pirabakaran set out his organisation’s political goals as the very same four demands that 
had been put forward in the first round of peace talks held 17 years earlier in 1985.
5  On the 
other side, the government actually found it impossible to offer the political concessions on 
devolution that it deemed necessary to reach a settlement - as they required constitutional 
amendments that were routinely deadlocked in parliament.  Although several prior rounds of 
negotiations were held in 1985, 1987, 1990, and 1995, none were successfully converted into 
                                                 
1 As of early 2003, the government and LTTE have sustained a cease-fire that has lasted for over one year, and 
have commenced political negotiations.  While it is too early to declare the war as over, this already represents 
the longest continuous absence of hostilities since 1983, and there are strong indications that a lasting settlement 
may be possible. 
2 UNHCR (2001) Provisional Statistics on Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR for the year 2000 says 
700,000 people were internally displaced.  Assuming the population of the north and east at 2.6 million.  From 
http://www.unhcr.ch, accessed August 2001. 
3 For recent economic studies on the costs of the war, see MARGA Institute (2001), Arunatilake, Jayasuriya and 
Kelegama (2001), Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993) 
4 This needs to be qualified somewhat as the LTTE’s political goals have often been somewhat fluid on the issue 
of separate statehood.  It is perhaps more accurate to say that the LTTE has been fighting for the recognition of 
the right to self-determination of the Tamils - where the recognition of this right does not necessarily imply its 
exercise, and where its exercise does not necessarily imply the creation of a separate state.  For example, as 
early as 1984, Pirabakaran declared that he was not fighting for territorial division but merely for the right to 
national self-determination – see Pratap (1984)  This position was clarified most recently during negotiations in 
Thailand in September 2002 when the LTTE negotiator Anton Balasingham stated that the goal was to achieve 
self-determination for Sri Lanka’s Tamils, not necessarily separation. 
5 The four demands, reiterated in Pirabakaran’s televised press conference on 10
th April 2002, were for the Sri 
Lankan government to recognise (i) the existence of the Tamils as a distinct nation (ii) that they had a distinct 
geographical homeland; (iii) their right to self-determination; (iv) equal Sri Lankan citizenship rights for all 
Tamils that sought it. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 3  
 
 
a durable settlement, and each one collapsed after a few months with hostilities resuming on 
more acrimonious terms.  In lieu of any such political rapprochement, each side ultimately 
hoped to force through a favourable political solution upon the other on the basis of military 
advantage. 
 
In military terms, the Sri Lankan Army and security forces have considerable superiority in 
weaponry and manpower, including unchallenged air supremacy that gives them a distinct 
advantage in conventional warfare.  The LTTE, in contrast, has the upper hand in guerrilla 
warfare, although through the 1990s, it increasingly sought to project itself as a conventional 
army.  The war revolved largely around control over the cities, towns, ports and 
communication routes of the north and east, most of which remain under tenuous government 
control.  However, although both sides won numerous, apparently decisive military victories, 
and have inflicted thousands of casualties on each other, these successes were often transitory 
and prone to reversal in what has been described as an “unwinnable” war.  Neither side was 
able to wrest a sufficiently decisive victory from the other, and as such, neither was capable 
of forcing a political solution through.  In effect, the internal dimensions of the conflict were 
locked in a multi-dimensional stalemate.  Militarily, both sides have had the resources to 
continue fighting in the near to middle term, but neither proved capable of actually defeating 
the other.
6  Politically, the bid-ask spread between the two sides appeared as unbridgeable in 
the late-1990s as it had been in the early-1980s. 
 
In contrast to this paralysis in the internal dimensions, the external context to the conflict had 
been considerably transformed, and frequently served as the driving force behind many 
internal developments.  The rapid changes in regional and international geopolitics, the global 
economy, global norms, and the prevalent ideological and cultural influences since 
independence in 1948 have had a decisive impact on Sri Lankan society as a whole, and on 
the genesis, character and subsequent development of the civil war and the underlying 
political conflict. 
 
As a small island state that emerged only recently from over four centuries of domination by 
three successive European powers, and that is separated by barely 30 kilometres from a giant 
neighbour, it is often problematic to draw sharp lines of delineation between the internal and 
external.  Much of what appears in Sri Lanka to be very internal and indigenous is actually 
the complex synthesis of successive waves of interlocking political, economic and cultural 
engagements with the outside world.  The current reality of Sri Lanka is itself a product of 
one such engagement and derives directly from the British annexation of the Kandyan 
kingdom in 1815 and subsequent administrative reforms in 1833 that brought the entire island 
under unified administration for the first time in almost 600 years.  This in turn set the stage 
for sweeping socio-economic and demographic transformations in the context of an 
expanding plantation economy that depended critically on global commodity and labour 
markets.  In that sense, contemporary Sri Lankan society (and the political origins of the 
present conflict) emerged during a period of unprecedented expansion in external contact.  
For the purposes of this analysis, distinctions between the internal and external are made in 
reference to the country’s present political borders, which do not necessarily correspond to 
current or historical geographies of national, cultural, linguistic, or economic significance. 
 
                                                 
6  Senior Sri Lankan defence analyst Iqbal Athas noted in April 2001 that the Sri Lankan government: “is 
conscious that despite pumping in millions for the purchase of weapons, a military victory is not in sight, or to 
put it plainly, not possible.”, quoted in Subramanian (2001) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 4  
 
 
The Sinhalese account for some 74 percent of the island’s population (estimated at 19 million 
as of 2001), and are concentrated in the south and west.  Tamils, with 18 percent, live largely 
in the north and coastal east, although there is a significant Tamil minority in the south.  
Roughly one-third of this Tamil population are the descendents of plantation labourers who 
emigrated from southern India in the period 1850-1950, and who still remain concentrated in 
the south-central plantation districts.  The remainder are descended from much older waves 
of Tamil migration to the island.  In addition, the mostly Tamil-speaking Muslim population, 
who are categorised as a separate socio-political group accounting for around 7 percent of the 
total population, comprise large minorities in many parts of the island.  Regionally, the north 
is predominantly Tamil, the south predominantly Sinhalese, and the eastern coastal districts 
are split roughly one-third each between Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese. 
 
In the first half of the 20
th century, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) was considered something of a 
model of political tranquillity and social development.  There was little experience of the 
kind of turbulent mass-based anti-colonial politics as in India, and while Tamil-Sinhala 
relations were sometimes acrimonious, they were never as sharp as India’s sectarian 
divisions.  At independence in 1948, power was transferred in very orderly fashion to a 
conservative, Anglicised native elite, who appeared almost unwilling to bid farewell to the 
British, and who subsequently kept the British monarch as titular head of state for a further 
25 years.  In a subcontinent marked by the trauma of partition, sectarian massacres, the 
displacement of millions, war in Kashmir, insurgency in Telengana, and the forced 
incorporation of recalcitrant princely states, the dominion of Ceylon was an island of peace 
and amiable coexistence. 
 
In this early post-colonial period, politics in the island emerged in relation to a relatively fluid 
matrix of language, class, caste, religion, and region.  However by the mid-1950s onwards, 
the Sinhala-Tamil or “communal” axis came to gain prominence and displace these others as 
the central divide in domestic politics.  The structural issues underlying this new political 
rivalry related primarily to the distribution of state patronage and government policy over 
issues such as official language, regional devolution, demographic encroachment,
7 and the 
availability of university places and public sector jobs.  Periodically, the tensions over these 
issues became magnified through trigger factors such as the introduction of the “Sinhala 
only” language act in 1956, the promulgation of a new constitution in 1972, as well as 
through outbreaks of violent urban riots, insurgent attacks by Tamil militants, and the 
presence of the (overwhelmingly Sinhalese) security forces in the north.   
 
During this period, Tamil minority politics consisted largely of strategic parliamentary-level 
lobbying by two mainstream Tamil political parties.  The Tamil Congress and the Federal 
Party sought to extract concessions from ruling governments on ostensibly Tamil issues by 
offering strategic parliamentary support to ruling governments, and where possible, 
participating in cabinet-level power-sharing agreements.  But by the mid-1970s, Tamil 
politics became radicalised amid widespread perceptions that parliamentary minoritism had 
done little to reverse their economic, political and cultural marginalisation at the hands of an 
increasingly sectarian pro-Sinhala state.  In 1976, the erstwhile Federal Party provocatively 
renamed itself the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), elaborated a clear demand for a 
separate state of Tamil Eelam, and won considerable success on this basis in the 1977 
elections.
8  At the same time, a number of more militant Tamil separatist groups also arose at 
                                                 
7 See Peebles (1990), Shastri (1990) 
8 The TULF’s stance reads as follows: “This convention resolves that restoration and reconstitution of the Free, 
Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of TAMIL EELAM, based on the right of self determination inherent to QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 5  
 
 
the fringes of the TULF, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who began 
to engage the state security forces in an insurgency campaign.  The escalation of fighting 
between the insurgents and the state, which continued through the late-1970s and early 
1980s, had by mid-1983 led to a situation of de facto civil war.  The north and east of the 
island have been embroiled in a state of war almost continuously from then to the time of the 
latest cease-fire in December 2001.
9 
 
The external context to these internal political developments and to the armed conflict that 
subsequently arose was of great significance and would ultimately come to play a major part 
in the course of events in the next two decades.  This paper attempts to track the external 
dimensions of the conflict in Sri Lanka, and to identify how they have been transformed over 
the period of its genesis in the post-colonial period to the outbreak of war in the early 1980s, 
and to its subsequent prolonged stalemate during the 1990s.  Clearly, it is problematic to 
develop this distinction between the internal and the external very far, and indeed, it is not 
intended to form the basis upon which an alternate explanation of the causation and 
dynamics of the war is developed.  This paper does not purport to suggest that the political 
conflict or civil war in Sri Lanka resulted from external rather than internal factors, and nor 
does it intend to deny the agency of internal actors, or indeed, the critical responsibility they 
bear in finding a political solution to the conflict. 
 
Instead, it develops a stylised narrative drawn selectively and eclectically from a combination 
of primary and secondary sources to discuss the complex, multi-layered external context 
within which Sri Lanka’s internal conflict has unfolded.  This external context is 
conceptualised here primarily in terms of two parallel processes, economic and political.  In 
economic terms, the underlying political economy of the conflict is traced to the nature of Sri 
Lanka’s changing relationship with the global economy in the post-colonial period.  In 
political terms (within which the military dimensions are also captured), the conflict has 
taken shape with respect to the prevalent external ideo-political paradigms and geo-political 
contentions.  It is argued that these external economic and political factors have undergone 
great change since the genesis of the conflict, and that the subsequent trajectory of the 
conflict and the interaction of the protagonists in the war/peace process can be better 
understood by situating them within this larger context. 
 
Much of the existing literature on the external dimensions of the Sri Lankan conflict has 
arisen within the framework of international relations and security studies.  Kadian (1990), 
Muni (1993), Bullion (1995), and a number of other important studies have discussed the 
conflict in terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan confrontation of the 1980s.  In contrast, during the 
1990s the external dimensions of the conflict have been discussed with respect not to 
international relations, but rather international terrorism.  For example, Gunaratna (1997) is 
directed at alerting foreign governments to the international security threat posed by the 
LTTE.  A quite different strand of literature examines the intersection of the conflict with the 
outside world not in terms of international relations, but the political economy of 
development.  The major preoccupations of this literature have been to examine the 
                                                                                                                                                         
every nation, has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this 
Country.” (Resolution passed at a convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front held at Pannakam, 
Vaddukodai, on 14 May 1976, otherwise known as the Vaddukodai Resolution), cited in full in De Silva (1998), 
Appendix IX. 
9 For detailed accounts of the origins of the conflict, see De Silva (1998), Bose (1994), Manor (1984), Tambiah 
(1986), Wilson (1988), Manogaran (1987), Ponnambalam (1983)  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 6  
 
 
relationship between structural adjustment and conflict,
10 and the role of aid donors in 
conflict reduction and post-conflict reconstruction.
11 
 
This paper attempts to weave together many of these different strands of international 
relations and political economy in a way that allows some coherent and generalisable 
inferences to be drawn out and developed.  Part 2 discusses the early period from the genesis 
of the conflict from the early post-colonial period to the outbreak of the civil war in the early 
1980s.  Part 3 discusses how this has changed in the 1990s.  Part 4 concludes and discusses 
some of the repercussions. 
 
 
2. Post-Colonial Political and Economic Developments 
 
Sri Lanka and the Global Economy:  Contemporary rational choice literature has viewed the 
economic dimensions of violence and conflict largely in terms of its narrow economic 
instrumentality to the conflict participants often subject to an individual cost-benefit analysis.  
In contrast, there are compelling reasons to view the economic dimensions of the conflict in 
terms of a much longer historical and global perspective.  In essence, the argument here is 
that the entire trajectory of Sri Lanka’s post-colonial politics, including the Sinhala-Tamil 
confrontation, is embedded within the larger transformations in Sri Lanka’s relationship to 
the global economy.  In particular, two significant historical periods of economic change 
correspond closely to equally significant turning points in the Sinhala-Tamil conflict. 
 
The first of these periods is 1955-59, during the transition from a plantation-export based 
laissez-faire economy to a public-sector driven import substitution model of industrial 
development.  At independence in 1948, Sri Lanka’s highly dualistic economy depended 
heavily on revenues from the prosperous export agriculture sector to fund a substantial 
programme of government welfare subsidies.  In an increasingly better educated, but poor 
country with little industrialisation and few formal sector job opportunities, high welfare 
subsidies were the price paid by the ruling elite to buy social peace and to check the rising 
popularity of the communist movement.  But the fragility of the post-colonial compact was 
such that domestic political stability essentially hinged upon favourable global commodity 
prices.   
 
At the same time in the early 1950s, Sri Lanka was on the cusp of a historic demographic 
transition, as the combined effects of better island-wide public education and public health 
since the 1930s had led to a surge in the population of better educated young job-seekers 
(both Sinhalese and Tamil).  The ruling UNP government, dominated by elites linked to the 
plantation export economy continued to follow broadly liberal economic policies of free trade 
and tight fiscal discipline that did little to foster industrialisation or alleviate this burgeoning 
demand for jobs.  The main thrust of the government’s development agenda in this period 
was agriculture rather than industry, and was driven by the desire to reduce food imports and 
to tackle the growing threat of rural unrest and pressure for land redistribution.  
 
This early post-colonial economic and political compact fell apart following the sharp decline 
in prices in the early 1950s that followed the boom generated by the Korean War.  Faced with 
the necessity for fiscal cutbacks, government proposals for reductions in welfare subsidies in 
                                                 
10 In particular, see Gunasinghe (1984), Manor (1984), Tambiah (1986), Moore (1990), Herring (1994), 
Dunham & Jayasuriya (2001). 
11 See for examp le, Ofstad (2002), Goodhand (2001). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 7  
 
 
1953 resulted in unprecedented mass political actions including a hartal, a general strike 
ordered by trade unions and left parties that became a grave source of concern to the 
government.  The hartal ultimately forced the Prime Minister’s resignation and caused the 
UNP’s landslide defeat at the next general elections.  Subsequently, the left-centre political 
coalition that surged into power on a tide of populist sentiment in 1956
12 brought a 
substantially different economic policy agenda based on import substitution industrialisation 
and the expansion of the public sector.  This occurred at least partly under the rationale of 
insulating the domestic economy from such external shocks and also as a means of quickly 
expanding formal sector employment.   
 
The period of economic transition initiated in the mid-1950s was essentially one of re-
engineering the form and terms of engagement of the domestic economy into the global 
economy.  At the same time, it also coincided closely with the period when the Sinhala-Tamil 
dimension began to occupy the centre of gravity of national politics.  While the 
unprecedented general strike of 1953 highlighted the depth of the latent class schisms 
underlying Sri Lankan society, this was followed just three years later by an equally 
unprecedented and almost inexplicable rise of anti-Tamil violence in the 1956-59 period.  
Effectively, this period of rapid economic transition was also one when the ethnic factor was 
injected into national politics in a way that has eclipsed the class dimension ever since.  Even 
on the occasions when class-based social and political formations have re-emerged after 
1956, they have either struggled uphill against the prevalence of Sinhala or Tamil nationalist 
consciousness or have expressed themselves directly through overtly nationalist discourse. 
 
During the two decades from 1956-76, government regulation of private sector enterprises, 
banking, and external trade was considerably increased and a number of key industries 
including finance, ports and oil were nationalised.
13  At the same time, the number of public 
sector enterprises quadrupled,
14 becoming an important source of scarce formal sector 
employment, and accounting for 12 percent of total GDP in the mid-1970s.
15  State 
employment expanded manifold to the extent that it came to account for almost a quarter of 
the total labour force by the late-1970s.
16 
 
However, as the crises of the mid-1970s demonstrated, the economy continued to be heavily 
vulnerable to external shocks after almost two decades of import-substitution.
17  Tea and 
rubber still accounted for over 70 percent of exports while the nascent import-substituting 
manufacturing sector itself critically depended on imports of intermediate and investment 
goods.  In addition, the centrality of the state in the industrialisation process meant that the 
availability of sought-after, but scarce economic and employment opportunities became 
increasingly rationed in terms of privileged access to political power.   
 
It is under these circumstances that the polarisation of politics along Tamil-Sinhala lines 
became accentuated, as state patronage was increasingly disbursed in ways that reflected the 
Sinhalese demographic and political dominance.  One of the most evident symptoms of this 
                                                 
12 The Mahajana Eksath Peramuna that took power in 1956 was a coalition of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP) with the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP). 
13 Although there was a period of partial liberalisation during the late-1960s under a UNP government. 
14 Between 1958-75, the number of public sector enterprises increased from 28 to 107 - Karunatilake (1987), 
p.146 citing Central Bank of Sri Lanka data. 
15 From Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994), p.47, citing Lakshman (1979)  Public Enterprises in the Economic 
Development of Sri Lanka: National Institute of Business Management. 
16  See Samarasinghe (1984), p.175. 
17 See Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994), chapter 4 for an extensive discussion of the 1973-75 crisis. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 8  
 
 
was in the composition of the sought-after public sector and civil service jobs, which had 
previously been dominated by Tamils, but which had become increasingly Sinhala-ised by 
the 1970s.  But the effects of state patronage were manifest not just in terms of employment, 
but also in the availability of private-sector contracts and permits, the location of labour-




Table 1: Sri Lanka – Indices of Terms of Trade and Import Capacity of Exports (Base Year 1950) 
 
Year  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Terms of Trade  100  99  89  69  50  28 
Import Capacity of Exports  100  110  104  91  65  41 
 
Source:  Calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics CD ROM 2001. 
 
Import substitution lasted just over two decades between the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s and 
ultimately crumbled in the face of an extraordinary and extended collapse in the country’s 
terms of trade during this very period.
18  Between 1955-75, Sri Lanka’s terms of trade 
dropped by 70 percent (see table 1), causing a worsening balance of payments and fiscal 
problem that subsequently reached crisis proportions following the effects of the 1973 global 
commodity price shock.  This meant that by the early-1970s, the SLFP coalition government 
was forced to institute the most serious cuts to food subsidies since the 1953 riots.  By the 
mid-1970s, unemployment levels had soared as high as 24 percent, (an increase in 10 
percentage points over the prior decade), while real wages of government employees had 
dropped by 37 percent between 1970-75.
19   
 
It is not surprising then that in the face of such economic dislocations, the early-1970s was a 
period when domestic politics was in great turmoil.  The stage was set for this as early as 
1971, when Sri Lanka was briefly, but comprehensively shaken by an armed rural uprising in 
the south organised by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the first such military 
challenge that the state had encountered since the 1840s.  In the face of mounting social 
unrest, the government armed itself with emergency powers, leading to an increasingly 
authoritarian and abrasive exercise of state power that further contributed to the polarisation 
of politics.  In the north, the economic crisis seriously compounded the existing frustrations 
that Tamils had faced for over a decade in accessing state-regulated education and 
employment opportunities, and ultimately radicalised a generation of Tamil youth who 
became (and remain) the leaders of the separatist movement.  Tamil separatist militancy 
traces its origins during this period to the 1972 formation of the LTTE’s antecedent 
organisation, the Tamil New Tigers, that went on to organisationally consolidate itself and 
adopt its current name in May 1976.
20  And it was largely as a result of considerable pressure 
from the more radical and militant youth organisations, that the previously constitutional and 
elite-based Tamil minority politics was pressed to adopt a separatist stance.   
 
                                                 
18 As Herring (1994) remarks, “The irony is that for all the political costs of ‘closing’ the economy [under 
import-substitution], in fact it remained in a critical sense open to external shocks.” 
19 Data on wage indices are based on Central Bank of Ceylon statistics listed in Athukorala and Jayasuriya 
(1994), (Statistical Appendix) while data on unemployment is taken from Karunatilake (1987), p.280, based on 
the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1973. 
20 For the early history of the LTTE and other militants groups, see Narayan Swamy (1994) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 9  
 
 
Thus, the period of transition from a laissez-faire plantation export economy to a public-
sector based import substitution economy in the late-1950s gave birth to the contemporary 
Tamil-Sinhala political conflict.  This conflict subsequently escalated through two decades as 
growing political discontent, aggravated by high overall levels of unemployment and 
inflation generated increasingly desperate state interventions.  Many of these state 
interventions, whether political, economic or cultural were demonstratively designed to 
generate and capitalise on majoritarian Sinhala sentiment, a factor that grew in importance as 
other sources of legitimacy and popular support came into question.  But with the spread of 
Tamil-Sinhala sectarian consciousness through the 1960s and 1970s, even state interventions 
and that had no such sectarian content - or economic circumstances such as unemployment  
that affected all communities more or less equally - came to be increasingly interpreted and 
channelled in ways that magnified this divide.  
 
The second major period of post-colonial economic transition in Sri Lanka was in the 1977-
83 period. This began with the 1977 elections that brought an abrupt end to import-
substitution policies as the UNP returned to power, launching a sweeping programme of trade 
liberalisation, private sector deregulation, and the dismantling of many welfare provisions.  
As one of the first countries to engage in what would later be known as a structural 
adjustment programme, Sri Lanka won the considerable support of the aid donor community 
and particularly that of the World Bank, which was anxious to ensure that it should serve as a 
successful role model for other developing countries.  As a result, Sri Lanka, which had 
effected a simultaneous shift in foreign policy towards the US-bloc, was rewarded with a 
massive wave of foreign aid-sponsored public sector investment projects in the post-1977 
period largely intended to cushion the domestic economic and political repercussions of the 
reforms.
21   
 
Although it might be expected that a reduction in state intervention and a consequent increase 
in employment and economic growth would diminish the scale of the conflict, particularly 
given the nature of its economic origins, it is precisely in the reform period between 1977-83 
that the political conflict was transformed into violent form.  In the north, the spiral of 
insurgency and counter-insurgency attacks escalated while in the south, a series of traumatic 
anti-Tamil riots broke out in cities such as Colombo for the first time since the late-1950s, 
with major incidents in 1977, 1979, 1981, and 1983.  The last and most serious of these riots 
in July 1983 ultimately catalysed the conflict into civil war. 
 
The actual impact of the “open economy” policy upon economic growth, poverty and 
welfare, which was greatly complicated by the second oil crisis in 1979, has been the subject 
of a long-standing academic controversy in development economics known as the “Sri Lanka 
growth and equity debate”.
22  Although much the economic analysis of the impact of the 
conflict has described how the effectiveness of the reforms have been retarded by the 
conflict, there is some merit in seeking to uncover the reverse direction of linkage.  To put it 
in terms of the categories earlier discussed, the shift from a dirigiste to a more market-based 
economic structure had the makings of a parallel shift back from ethnic to class based politics 
of the type that was taking shape in the early-1950s.  In order to answer why it subsequently 
resulted in an escalation of violence along ethnic lines instead of an “IMF riot”, Dunham and 
Jayasuriya (2001) for example, argue that the liberalisation process, midwifed by 
unprecedented levels of aid flows did not actually end ethnically-biased rent-seeking from the 
                                                 
21 See Herring (1994), Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994), Kelegama (1990). 
22 See Dunham and Jayasuriya (2000) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 10  
 
 
state-sector, but expanded it to new groups that benefited from the climate of heightened 
tension and authoritarianism.  The police and military, for example, found: 
 
“fertile ground for large-scale self-enrichment through the control of state 
power….A mutually reinforcing process of economic ‘reforms’ and socio-political 
decay was thus set in motion.” 
 
Gunasinghe (1984) argues that the disproportionate impact of the reforms on Sinhalese versus 
Tamils may have formed the basis for heightened animosity between the two groups.  In 
particular, he suggests that small-scale Sinhalese industrialists, (who had previously benefited 
from state intervention) became worse-off under the reforms as they could no longer compete 
with cheap imports or capitalise on their preferential access to state power.  In contrast, 
Colombo’s Tamil merchant class, whose lack of access to the state had for long restricted 
them to commerce rather than industry, appeared to have benefited greatly from the removal 
of trade barriers and the consequent boom in imported goods. 
 
Obeyesekere (1984), Manor (1984), and Tambiah (1986), among others suggest that the 
sudden, unequal economic impact of the reforms caused abrupt and disorienting social 
repercussions, and was subsequently accompanied by the institutionalisation of political 
violence and greater government authoritarianism.  Dunham and Jayasuriya (2000) for 
example, suggest that Sri Lanka’s generous welfare subsidies had important positive 
externalities in terms of buying social peace, and that their dismantling unleashed a social 
unravelling that has been manifest in terms of worsening problems of social order and violent 
conflict.  As such, the growth of Tamil militancy is explained as just one manifestation of an 
all-encompassing violence that gripped Sri Lankan society and politics since the late-1970s.  
It emerged from the social upheavals, poverty, lumpenisation and socio-political decay 
engendered by the reforms as well as from the increasingly violent and authoritarian 
measures used by the government to suppress opposition to the reforms.  
 
Moore (1985), Shastri (1990), and Samarasinghe (1996), describe the differential impact of 
agricultural trade liberalisation on the regionally differentiated distribution of tradable versus 
non-tradable crops.  Due to climatic and historical reasons, the island’s export agriculture 
sector in tea, rubber and coconuts was concentrated largely in the south, while agriculture in 
the Jaffna peninsula was restricted to minor food crops such as bananas, onions, chillies for 
domestic consumption.  While trade liberalisation benefited the export sector in the south, it 
had resulted in a sharp depression of prices of domestic food crops in the north.  In this way, 
it could have fed into long-standing Tamil grievances regarding regional development 
inequalities in the north, relating to the unequal distribution of public sector projects and the 
acceleration of demographically sensitive irrigation and resettlement schemes.
23 
 
Thus, the links between the economic reforms and the exacerbation of the conflict have been 
analysed in several quite different mechanisms such as (i) the unequal impact of the reforms 
upon the poor; (ii) the unequal impact of the reforms upon different segments of the 
ethnically-differentiated business strata; (iii) the unequal regional impact of the reforms upon 
Tamil versus Sinhalese regions; (iv) the heightened opportunities for ethnically politicised 
rent-seeking engendered by the massive aid boom that accompanied the reforms; (v) the 
increase in political violence and state authoritarianism which arose partly in response to 
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suppressing these manifestations of social disorder, both spontaneous and organised, which 
emerged from the reform process.   
 
Clearly, some of these hypothesised mechanisms appear to be at least partly in contradiction 
with others and deserve greater empirical substantiation.  But all of them share a common 
understanding that in a society where gradations of occupation and class are sandwiched 
between different layers of regional and ethnic identities, the frustrations that resulted from 
the abrupt and unequal distribution of costs and benefits from the reforms either resulted in 
the greater Sinhala-Tamil hostility - or were actively engineered in that direction. 
 
In sum, domestic politics in Sri Lanka evolved during the post-colonial period in close 
relation to the changing nature of the Sri Lankan economy and its linkages to the global 
economy.  The present political conflict emerged during the transition from a plantation-
export based economy to a public-sector driven import substitution industrialisation model of 
development.  It accelerated and assumed violent form as the state dismantled welfare 
subsidies and import-substitution policies, replacing them rapidly with a private-sector driven 
export-oriented industrialisation model. 
 
South Asian Geopolitics in the 1970s: From the early 1970s onwards, and particularly during 
the 1983-90 period, India came to occupy an overwhelming presence in internal 
developments in Sri Lanka.  During this period, it became the central external factor in the 
Tamil Eelam movement and the Sri Lankan civil war arising from a number of overlapping 
historical, geo-strategic, cultural and political reasons.  India’s dominant nearby presence less 
than thirty miles away, and with a population more than fifty times in size has inevitably been 
an important influence in Sri Lanka.  The Indian peninsula has historically been the source of 
migration, cultural flows and military invasion of the island stretching back over at least two 
millennia.  The most recent wave of immigration from India occurred between 1850-1950 
when large numbers of migrant Tamil labourers were brought to Sri Lanka to work on the 
expanding plantation sector. 
 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, developments in the Indian subcontinent played an important 
and multi-faceted role, both active and passive in the genesis of the conflict.  Internal and 
regional political developments in South Asia critically shaped the dynamic of Indo-Sri 
Lankan relations and the evolution of both Tamil Eelam and Sinhala nationalisms.  After the 
escalation to civil war in 1983, India hosted over 100,000 refugees from Sri Lanka, while the 
Indian central government and the state government of Tamil Nadu were responsible for 
providing many of the financial, military and diplomatic resources that sustained the 
separatist movement.
24  The Sri Lankan government, in contrast, tried (with limited success) 
to mobilise support and resources from the U.S., Britain, Israel, China and Pakistan, largely 
to counteract India’s support for the separatists, while continuing to rely on external trade and 
external capital flows for government finance, both to sustain military expenditures and to 
maintain normalcy in the rest of the economy.  Between 1987-90, Indian intervention in Sri 
Lanka reached its climax when 100,000 Indian troops were deployed to enforce an ill-fated 
political settlement that not only failed spectacularly to end the conflict, but that transformed 
it, and ultimately propelled it into a qualitatively new phase. 
 
                                                 
24 The existence of militant training camps in India was denied by New Delhi, but subsequently became the 
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In the early 1970s, as Sri Lankan Tamil politics stood at a critical transitory phase, the 
political geography of the South Asian region was substantially altered following the break-
up of Pakistan’s two constituent wings.  The civil war that erupted in East Pakistan between 
the Pakistani army and Bengali separatist militias in March 1971, and that ended following 
Indian military intervention against Pakistan in December 1971 remains the most significant 
event in South Asia’s post-colonial history.  It not only thrust India into a position of 
unquestioned regional pre-eminence, but also created a precedent in international law, as 
Bangladesh became the world’s first successful post-colonial secessionist state,
25 and 
remained so for the rest of the cold war period.   
 
The right to self-determination is upheld in weak form in the United Nations founding 
charter, and was subsequently elaborated upon and strengthened in a series of General 
Assembly resolutions after 1960, although this appeared to refer largely to the ongoing 
process of decolonisation.  In 1970, just months before the East Pakistan crisis erupted, the 
U.N. Declaration of Friendly Relations (UNGA Resolution 2625), said: 
 
… all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, 
their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right... 
 
But later in the text, this right is subject to the limitation that: 
 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States …  
 
In other words, there was considerable international legitimacy and support for the right to 
self-determination, although this did not appear to extend to the case of post-colonial 
secession.  Amid this ambiguity in the de jure legitimacy of secession in post-colonial states, 
the de facto independence of East Pakistan, the subsequent creation of a sovereign state of 
Bangladesh, and the rapid international recognition it gained
26 appeared to lend greater 
international legitimacy to post-colonial secession. 
 
But more important than the precedent it set for international law was that created by the very 
circumstances in which Bangladesh was created and the repercussions it held for South Asian 
regional geopolitics.  The secession of nearby East Pakistan through an armed domestic 
uprising with Indian military backing, and the consequent expansion of India’s relative 
position in the region was to have important consequences in Sri Lanka at a time when 
domestic politics was in considerable convulsion.  Indeed, it is during this highly charged 
period from 1971-1976, in the immediate aftermath of the East Pakistan secession that Sri 
Lankan Tamil politics made the critical transition from federalism to separatism.  As De Silva 
(1998), (p.242) describes: 
 
[Between] May 1972 and the end of 1976, we see a momentous shift in the 
political aspirations of the Sri Lanka Tamils, from demands for structural changes 
                                                 
25 With the possible exceptions of two short-lived federations that collapsed within two years of their formation. 
Senegal became independent as part of the Mali Federation in 1959 but withdrew in 1960.  Singapore, which 
joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963, withdrew in 1965. 
26 Bangladesh received international recognition on a bilateral basis at an early stage, but was only admitted to 
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and constitutional reform, to an assertion of the right to self-determination on the 
basis of a Tamil state in Sri Lanka.  
 
This is not to suggest some very mechanical linkage between the development of Sri Lankan 
Tamil separatism and the creation of Bangladesh.  But there is a substantial weight of 
circumstantial evidence concerning the close sequence of the two events and what appears to 
be the many similarities between the causes leading to the growth of separatist sentiment 
among Pakistan’s erstwhile Bengali majority and nearby Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority.  Given 
the existence of the close historical links between Sri Lankan Tamils and India, it would not 
have been out of the question to consider that a similar Indian intervention, military or 
diplomatic, might occur in Sri Lanka to secure a separate Tamil homeland.  Indeed, it 
appeared that an influential section of the Sri Lankan Tamil political spectrum actively 
sought such an outcome, and the (apparently real) possibility that this could occur formed an 
implicit if not explicit part of the rationale in advancing a separatist platform. 
 
The Tamil Nadu Factor: Eelam War I (1983-87) broke out in July 1983, following an LTTE 
ambush in the north, during which thirteen Sinhalese army soldiers were killed.  The news of 
the ambush caused outrage and a violent backlash against Tamils in the south in which the 
complicity of then ruling UNP government was widely alleged.
27  In the days following the 
riots, during which an estimated 3,000 people were killed, large numbers of Tamils from 
around the island fled to the north, and often from there to southern India.  The sudden 
appearance of over one hundred thousand displaced, embittered Tamils in northern Sri Lanka 
and southern India resulted in a surge of political support, new recruits, and international 
propagandists for the militant groups.  As a result, the political centre of gravity of Sri 
Lankan Tamil politics, which had already effected a shift in favour of separatism over 
federalism in the mid-1970s, effected a second shift in favour of the militant groups and 
armed struggle over the parliamentary Tamil parties and “normal” constitutional politics.   
 
Support for the Sri Lankan Tamils was particularly high among India’s fifty million Tamils in 
the south-eastern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, who share close historical links of language, 
culture and religion with Sri Lankan Tamils.  The vivid press coverage of the July 1983 riots, 
followed by the arrival of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees evoked considerable 
sympathy in Tamil Nadu, which quickly became transformed into the most important 
external mass base of political support for the Eelam movement.  Internal developments in 
post-colonial Tamil politics in India had also created an environment that was particularly 
receptive to the Sri Lankan Tamil cause.  In Tamil Nadu, politics had been transformed in the 
1950s and 1960s by the growth of a Tamil nationalist “Dravida” movement, which eventually 
culminated in the electoral victory of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)
28 in state 
elections in 1967.  The DMK’s ascendance as an electoral party had occurred in the context 
of a multi-layered challenge to New Delhi’s authority based around resistance to the 
imposition of Hindi as a single national language, and the promotion of a distinct Tamil 
political and cultural identity.
29   
 
                                                 
27 This allegation was made at the time in various media reports and became the object of some speculation.  
More recently, the Sri Lankan President, Chandrika Kumaratunga herself has made frequent references to her 
predecessor’s involvement – for example in an interview on BBC’s Hard Talk on 30 October 2001, she spoke of 
the Jayawardene government’s “huge pogrom against the Tamil people in July 1983”. 
28 Progressive Dravidian Federation.   
29 See Washbrook (1989). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 14  
 
 
In its early years during the 1940s and 1950s, the DMK had actually advocated the separation 
of India’s southern states into a sovereign “Dravidistan”, although this demand was pursued 
with great ambivalence and was ultimately abandoned in the early 1960s as the DMK came 
closer to a substantial electoral victory at the state level.  However, beyond these superficial 
similarities in post-colonial Tamil politics in India and Sri Lanka, the links between Eelam 
and Dravida nationalisms were in reality weak, the two having developed under substantially 
different historical and socio-economic circumstances, and along virtually opposite political 
trajectories.
30  But by the late 1970s, the increasingly violent escalation of the “ethnic 
problem” in Sri Lanka forced the two to relate to one another much closer as the Eelam issue 
was effectively injected into Dravida politics.   
 
Following the July 1983 riots in Colombo, and the subsequent arrival of large numbers of 
Tamil refugees into southern India, public opinion in Tamil Nadu was inflamed to the extent 
that local political parties and personalities actually competed with each other to champion 
the Sri Lankan Tamil cause.  The Dravida parties in particular felt the obligation to 
demonstrate pan-Tamil solidarity, launching high profile campaigns to provide assistance to 
the Sri Lankan Tamil cause (both for refugee relief and for the different political groups), and 
exerting great pressure on New Delhi to intercede on their behalf with Colombo.  Thus, 
between 1983-87, as the locus of Sri Lankan Tamil politics had at least partially been 
displaced onto Tamil Nadu, it began to interact much more closely with Tamil Nadu politics 
and subsequently even mapped onto its existing rivalries.  The then ruling party in Tamil 
Nadu, the AIADMK,
31 and the state’s Chief Minister M.G.Ramachandran,
32 came to be 
closely linked with the LTTE, while the main opposition party, the DMK, and its leader 
M.Karunanidhi became associated with one of the LTTE’s main rivals, the Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organisation (TELO). 
 
But the impact of political developments in Tamil Nadu during the post-colonial period must 
be seen not just in terms of Sri Lankan Tamils, but of the entire dialectic of Sinhala-Tamil 
relations, and in the parallel development of both Tamil and Sinhala nationalism.
33  Despite 
the fact that they form a large majority, Sinhala nationalism has fed on the notion of the 
Sinhalese as an encircled minority vis-à-vis a monolithic, pan-Tamil “other” comprising 
northern Sri Lanka and nearby Tamil Nadu who together outnumber the Sinhalese by a ratio 
of almost five to one.  As a Sinhalese parliamentarian declaimed in a debate: 
 
In this country the problem of the Tamils is not a minority problem. The Sinhalese 
are a minority in Dravidastan. We are carrying on a struggle for our national 
existence against the Dravidastan majority”
34 
 
The basis for such an axis of configuration emerges from contemporary Sinhala nationalist 
historiography, which has sought to recall the pre-colonial history of the island in terms of an 
enduring struggle by the indigenous Sinhalese against expansionist Tamil armies from the 
Indian peninsula.  The 6th century Pali chronicle, the Mahavamsa, which contains the 
Sinhalese founding myth and forms a central pillar of contemporary Sinhala national 
                                                 
30 This point is argued at some length in Krishna (1997). 
31 The AIADMK (All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) was formed by a split from the DMK in 1972. 
32 Ramachandran (1917-87), known by his initials as “MGR”, was a legendary Tamil cinema icon of the 1950s 
and 1960s, who had starred in many films inspired by the Dravida movement, and was himself born to a family 
of migrant Indian tea plantation workers in Sri Lanka - see Pandian (1992)  
33 See Tambiah (1992), Jayawardena (1985), Dharmadasa (1992) on contemporary Sinhala nationalism. 
34 Kearney (1973), p.164.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS99   Page 15  
 
 
consciousness, provides the foundations for this in its panegyric to the 2nd century BC 
Sinhala prince Dathagamani, who fought and won a long war against a Tamil usurper Elara.  
This epic Sinhala-Tamil confrontation has often been recalled in the context of 20th century 
Sinhala-Buddhist revivalism, and the Sinhala-Tamil communal axis since the mid-1950s.  
The contemporary political significance of this historiography is described as having had: 
 
…a profound influence in shaping popular perceptions of the past, and of the 
role of the Tamils in Sri Lankan history as the single most powerful and 
persistent threat confronting the Sinhalese. 
35 
 
It is in this sense that the creation of the present Indian state of Tamil Nadu in 1956, the 
growth of the militant Dravida movement there during the 1950s and 1960s, and its electoral 
victory in 1967 is almost of greater significance in Sri Lanka to Sinhala nationalism for 
which these events represented potent and threatening symbols of the resurgence of a 
historical nemesis.  Beyond this symbolic relevance, the presence of nearby Tamil Nadu has 
significance for the political economy of the conflict in terms of the way it was used to 
establish an ethnic hierarchy of indigeneity in the island, and thus to legitimise an ethnically-
defined hierarchy of citizenship rights.  Tamil Nadu effectively served to remind Sri Lanka’s 




In summary, as Sri Lankan Tamil separatism gained critical mass in the 1970s, it found not 
just cultural cousins across the Palk Straits, but the possibility of meaningful political support 
from a like-minded tradition of Tamil nationalism.  At the same time, this very nexus of 
Dravida-Eelam interaction, which existed more in the realm of rhetoric than reality until the 
early-1980s, was (combined with India’s increasing regional assertiveness) an important 
factor that fed into the most fundamental concerns of Sinhala nationalist sentiment.  To the 
extent that this sentiment was institutionalised within the Sri Lankan state (as it increasingly 
was after 1956), the worsening dynamic of Sinhala-Tamil relations became manifest in terms 
of a growing confrontation between the Sri Lankan state and the Tamil minority. 
 
Indo-Sri Lankan relations: The Indian central government’s support for the Tamil militants 
was based on a coincidence of quite separate internal and external compulsions.  The internal 
component was in response to the considerable domestic pressures from Tamil Nadu to 
intervene in Sri Lanka, although this was also subject to New Delhi’s concerns about 
preventing the rise of any separatist sentiment or pan-Tamil movement in Tamil Nadu itself.  
Externally, India’s policy towards both the Sri Lankan government and the Sri Lankan Tamil 
militants was guided by the strong desire to prevent outside powers (particularly the US or its 
cold war allies) from using either side as an entry point for interference into India’s self-
declared sphere of influence, and also to ensure that the conflict, while it lasted long enough 
to punish Sri Lanka, was settled quickly on terms favourable to India.  
 
India and Sri Lanka had enjoyed a relatively friendly decade in the 1970s when by 
coincidence they were both ruled by centre-left parties in the 1970-77 period and later both 
by centre-right parties between 1977-80.   Relations worsened considerably after 1980, when 
                                                 
35 De Silva (1998), p.11, and also Gunawardana (1995) and Spencer (1990). 
36 This factor also helps to explain why the elite-based Sri Lankan Tamil federalist politics of the 1950s and 
1960s kept its distance from Tamil Nadu and from the populist Dravida movement at a time when such links 
would have been counter-productive for their claims to indigeneity in the island, and to their quest for domestic 
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this coincidence ended, and a centre-left Congress (I) party under Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi regained power in India and quickly developed a hostile relationship with Sri Lanka’s 
centre-right government of President Junius Jayawardene.  At a time in the early 1980s when 
cold war tensions in Afghanistan caused a substantial US military build-up on India’s western 
borders, Jayawardene’s strong pro-US foreign policy stance heightened concerns in New 
Delhi that India was slowly being encircled by hostile forces. 
 
Shortly after the July 1983 riots, Indira Gandhi declared that outside interference in the Sri 
Lankan crisis would be very unwelcome, although in this regard, India was apparently not to 
be viewed as an outsider: 
 
Sri Lanka and India are the two countries who are directly involved.  Any 
extraneous involvement will complicate matters for both our countries. 
37  
 
Thus, in addition to its internal compulsions, New Delhi’s advocacy of the Tamil cause and 
generous support of the Eelam militants were in effect measures by the aspiring regional 
hegemon to punish and exert pressure on the small, but strategically important island that had 
allied itself with India’s geo-political rivals.  Indo-Sri Lankan hostility snowballed between 
1983-86 as Indian hostility over outside (non-Indian) influence in Sri Lanka fuelled an 
increasingly desperate urge in Colombo to counter India with even more outside support.  As 
a result, India’s foreign policy mandarins came to view Sri Lanka as an increasingly 
dangerous nest of international intrigue directed against India: 
 
there were Israeli intelligence operatives, British counter insurgency experts, 
South African mercenaries, and rumours about offering Trincomalee, one of the 
finest deep water harbours to the US navy.
38 
 
The Indian government’s direct sponsorship of virtually all the different militant groups 
(there were at least five operating in the early 1980s) also emanated from this coincidence of 
external and internal factors.  It was envisaged that as each remained overwhelmingly 
dependent on Indian patronage, with training camps in India and their leaders resident in 
Madras, they would all remain under New Delhi’s control and would not seek to cultivate 
other state patrons.  Furthermore, the existence of a multiplicity of Sri Lankan Tamil militant 
groups dependent on Indian patronage meant that New Delhi could pick and choose between 
them, selectively rewarding the ones more amenable to its agenda.   
 
Finally, in addition to supporting and arming the Tamil militant groups, India also realised 
that if the war became prolonged, it would become counter-productive to the extent that it 
would inevitably attract unwelcome external peace-making attention.  As a result, India also 
sought to retain tight control over any possible political settlement of the conflict.  As Indian 
intelligence agencies trained and armed the militant groups, a succession of Indian foreign 
ministry officials shuttled between New Delhi, Madras and Colombo to convince the exiled 
Tamil leadership and the Sri Lankan government to arrive at a negotiated political settlement 
of the conflict.   
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In sum, following the events of July 1983, the strong coincidence of internal and external 
compulsions for New Delhi meant that the escalation to civil war also triggered a parallel 
escalation of India’s role in the war, both as war-maker and peace-maker. 
 
Sri Lanka and the World: The Sri Lankan government itself lobbied heavily among other 
countries including Pakistan, China, Israel, the USA and the UK for financial, military and 
diplomatic support to counter Indian pressure.  However, although Colombo held close 
political ties with the US and its cold war allies,
39 most of these countries avoided offering 
any considerable support during this period, at least partly to avoid antagonising India.  The 
Sri Lankan crisis did not bear any overwhelming strategic value, (either in the economic 
sense such as oil or in terms of the cold war political calculus) of an extent that warranted 
risking a major diplomatic confrontation with New Delhi.   
 
In addition, international media coverage of the 1983 riots, reports by international human 
rights NGOs, and the arrival of thousands of Tamil refugees in Europe and North America 
helped to publicise the Sri Lankan Tamil case internationally and made it more complicated 
internally for many governments to openly support Colombo, which came to be viewed as 
guilty of promoting genocidal policies towards its minorities.  The human rights issue also 
became the basis of India’s diplomatic offensive against Sri Lanka in the mid-1980s, 
particularly at multilateral bodies such as the United Nations.  At the opening session of the 
UN General Assembly in 1984, the Indian External Affairs Minister Ram Niwas Mirdha 
remarked: 
 
In Sri Lanka there has been a resurgence of indiscriminate violence and killing by 




Consequently, in 1986 and 1987, special reports to the UN Human Rights Commission listed 
Sri Lanka as one of a handful of countries where involuntary disappearances had increased,
41 




Table 2: Sri Lanka – Net Capital Flows, Official versus Private 1982-87 (current US dollar millions).  
 
Flow Type  1982  1983 1984 1985  1986 1987
Official (Multilateral)  114  128  149  149  166  180 
Official (Bilateral  324  369  343  365  445  368 
Private  285  96 115 70  40 -4
Aggregate  630  521 555 518  563 438
 
Source: World Bank Global Development Finance 2001 CD ROM. 
 
The economic repercussions of the conflict were immediately felt in terms of declining 
tourist inflows and declining foreign capital flows, particularly private sector flows such as 
                                                 
39 It is interesting to note that in the immediate aftermath of the July 1983 riots, Jayawardene, perhaps in a bid to 
deflect foreign criticism, told the foreign media that the violence was the result of a communist-backed coup 
attempt - and promptly banned the pro-Moscow Communist Party, the Trotskyite LSSP, and the JVP – see 
Claiborne (1983).   
40 United Nations (1984). 
41 Associated Press (1986). 
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foreign direct investment.  However, as figure 2 above demonstrates, external capital flows to 
Sri Lanka still contained a large component of official flows from bilateral and multilateral 
donors, which continued to grow during the initial years of the war and partly compensated 
for the loss of private flows.  In addition, the absence of an externally induced economic 
crisis such as that of the 1970s ensured a measure of macroeconomic stability that provided 
the government with some degrees of freedom (see table 3 below). 
 
Table 3: Sri Lanka – GDP growth rate and Indices of Terms of Trade and Import Capacity of Exports 
(Base Year 1980) , 1982-87 
 
Index  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Terms of Trade      88     108     131     108     104     107  
Import Capacity of Exports  101  113  161  144  146  157 
GDP growth (percent)  4.1%  4.8%  5.1%  5.0%  4.4%  1.7% 
 
Source:  Calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics 2001 CD ROM.  GDP data from World 
Bank World Development Indicators 2001 CD-ROM. 
  
Sri Lanka’s cold war allies, many of whom were also its aid donors, and who were also now 
becoming host to increasing numbers of Tamil refugees, did not rush to either embrace or 
isolate Sri Lanka politically once the civil war started.  Neither did they wish to significantly 
change their existing official economic relationships through aid or other instruments such as 
trade policy.  Even countries such as the US and Britain, that wished to offer military support 
to Sri Lanka decided to do so at an arms-length basis, using semi-official and secret channels.  
In response to urgent requests for military support after 1983, Sri Lanka was directed to the 
Israeli secret agencies by the US and to “Keeny Meeny Services”, an offshore mercenary 
firm by the British.
43 
 
In effect, despite the efforts of the Sri Lankan government to internationalise the conflict in a 
way that it could find beneficial, the external dimensions of both war and peace during Eelam 
War I remained tightly anchored to India.  The Indian government’s often inchoate and 
contradictory interventions with respect to the war/peace process were calibrated to ensure 
that New Delhi’s own interests prevailed with respect to a multitude of different parties 
including the Tamil Nadu electorate, the various Sri Lankan Tamil groups, the Sri Lankan 
government, and global cold war era geopolitics.  Indian support played a critical part in the 
ability of the militant groups to escalate the insurgency campaign into full-fledged civil war 
by late-1983.  But at the same time, this meant that New Delhi (with varying degrees of 
success) gained control of the various insurgent groups, influencing their political orientation, 
and altering the balance of inter-group political and military strength.  Similarly, India’s 
energetic diplomacy formed the basis for political negotiations between the Sri Lankan 
government, the militants and the parliamentary TULF throughout the 1983-87 period.  But 
again, this meant that the form and content of these negotiations was one that was ultimately 
subordinate to New Delhi’s own interests and ambitions.   
 
In this way, the entire trajectory of the conflict, particularly after 1983, became subject to a 
larger logic that the protagonists themselves had little to do with.  Essentially India 
contributed to the destabilisation of Sri Lanka in the 1980s not in order to support the Tamils’ 
right to self-determination - but strictly to the extent that this could provide the basis upon 
which a more pliant Sri Lanka could be quickly re-stabilised.  India viewed the conflict in Sri 
Lanka within the lens of its own strategic ambitions as an instrument towards achieving this 
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end, and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987 represented what briefly appeared to be the 
successful conclusion of this project. 
 
The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord:  India’s two-track policy during 1983-87 of sponsoring 
both Tamil militancy and peace talks appeared to have reached its crowning glory in the July 
1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, a political settlement that finally brought Eelam War I to an 
end.  Under the Accord, the Sri Lankan government agreed to make various concessions in 
the form of regional devolution and elections as a compromise solution short of secession, to 
be conducted under the oversight of an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).  However, the 
accord had all but failed within a few months of its implementation, as it provoked a new war 
in the north, and a visceral political reaction in the Sinhalese south. 
 
None of the Eelam groups were actually party to the Accord, but it was considered that as 
their patron, India would be able to prevail upon them to accept it.  Meanwhile, by the time 
the Accord was signed in July 1987, the LTTE had already successfully established itself as 
the most powerful militant group by far after having militarily crippled its rivals in a series of 
short, but decisive encounters.  Most of the other militant groups accepted the Accord and 
surrendered their arms to the IPKF in August 1987.  However, this was not the case with the 
LTTE, who expressed great discomfort with the way the Accord was imposed upon them,
44 
and who secretly retained most of their arms through two months of uneasy co-existence with 
the IPKF.  By October 1987, a sequence of controversial events, including the capture and 
suicide of a group of LTTE militants by the Sri Lankan security forces and the massacre of 
Sinhalese villagers sparked a new war between the IPKF and the LTTE that marked the most 
complex reversal in the island’s armed conflict. 
 
Although it was widely expected that the LTTE would soon either compromise or crumble in 
the face of one of the world’s largest armies, this proved not to be the case.  The stand-off 
between the LTTE and IPKF quickly evolved into an unexpected and bitter guerrilla war that 
lasted two and a half years, ending with the IPKF’s unceremonious withdrawal from Sri 
Lanka in March 1990.  Not only did the IPKF’s presence fail to enforce the political 
settlement in the north, but it also induced a serious political destabilisation in the south, 
where widespread opposition to the Indian military presence precipitated the rise of a violent 
anti-government insurgency.  In its campaign against the LTTE, the IPKF quickly lost the 
support of the Sri Lankan Tamil population that they had ostensibly come to protect, and 
came to be accused of the same kinds of atrocities against civilians that India had earlier 
charged the Sri Lankan government with.  Ultimately, the IPKF’s withdrawal, which 
occurred within four months of Rajiv Gandhi’s electoral defeat in November 1989 brought an 
end to what was viewed as a humiliating, self-inflicted disaster for India, who appeared 
incapable of defeating the small guerrilla group that they had themselves only recently 
trained, armed, and presumed to control. 
 
Subsequently, a combination of events between 1989-91, including the Gulf War, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war, internal political instability in India, a 
serious balance of payments crisis, the eruption of insurgency in Kashmir, and Rajiv 
Gandhi’s assassination gave rise to substantial changes in India’s internal and external 
political alignments.  As officials in New Delhi drew the conclusion that their entire Sri 
Lanka policy of the 1980s had disastrously backfired, the IPKF’s withdrawal from Sri Lanka 
came to be symbolic of a much broader Indian withdrawal from the central role it played in 
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the island for the entire decade of the 1980s.  As a result, India’s multi-faceted role as the 
central external dimension of the Sri Lankan conflict also came to an end in early 1990. 
 
 
3. Global Dimensions after 1990 
 
In the vacuum created by India’s abrupt departure from Sri Lanka, a new factor has emerged 
around which the external political dimensions of the civil war have subsequently evolved.  
Eelam War II, which began in June 1990, several months after the withdrawal of the IPKF, 
was a resumption of hostilities between Sri Lankan government forces and the LTTE.  
Although the new war appeared superficially to be a return to the status-quo ante of mid-1987 
before the IPKF, it was substantially different in many ways.  Whereas at the start of Eelam 
War I, the Tamil Eelam movement comprised a mainstream political organisation (TULF) 
and a number of competing militant groups, it had by 1990 been reduced to just a single 
militant group, the LTTE.  The LTTE had gained the prestige of having refused to 
compromise (unlike the other groups) on a separatist state, and further, having faced down 
one of the world’s largest armies.  Most other militant groups such as PLOTE, TELO and 
EPRLF had already been militarily crippled by the LTTE since 1986, and have continued to 
exist after 1990 as “paramilitaries” fighting on the government side against the LTTE. 
 
With the abrupt reversal in its relationship with India between 1987-91, the LTTE had 
suddenly lost not just its main diplomatic and financial sponsor, but also rear bases, a 
logistical support network, and supply lines.  The considerable loss of pride suffered by India 
in its Sri Lankan debacle with the loss of 1,200 Indian soldiers and the widespread allegations 
of the LTTE’s involvement in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991 had turned India’s 
attitude to the LTTE from one of ill-concealed support in the early 1980s to open, but 
restrained hostility by the early 1990s.  Even the Tamil Nadu factor appeared to have been 
greatly eclipsed in this period as support for the Sri Lankan Tamil cause, and particularly for 
the militancy represented by the LTTE had reversed.  There were still around 150,000 Sri 
Lankan Tamils in India (65,000 in refugee camps) through the 1990s, and there exists 
substantial humanitarian concern and sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils.  But there has 
considerably less sympathy for the LTTE following the IPKF episode, and particularly after 
Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in May 1991.  It is under these complex circumstances that the 
Sri Lankan Tamil refugee diaspora has emerged in the 1990s as the nucleus around which the 
external political dimensions of the war have re-assembled.
45 
 
Sri Lankan Tamil (SLT) Diaspora: The significance of the overseas SLT population to the 
civil war lies in three factors.  The first is its size, which as of 2001, is estimated at between 
600,000 to 800,000 in strength.  In other words, the diaspora accounts for between 23 percent 
to 30 percent of the global SLT population of 2.7 million.
46  The second is its location, spread 
across North America, Western Europe, Asia and Australia, which renders it of considerable 
strategic, economic, and political value.  As of 2001, there were an estimated 250,000 Sri 
Lankan Tamils in North America (the large majority in Canada), 200,000 in Western Europe, 
150,000 in India and 30,000 in Australia.
47  The third factor is its close emotional proximity 
to events in Sri Lanka.  The diaspora is itself largely a consequence of the war, consisting 
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mainly of war-related exiles and refugees.  As many of its members retain vivid memories of 
the traumatic circumstances that forced them to leave, they have maintained close 
involvement in contemporary military and political events in the island. 
 
The most significant expression of the political involvement of this sizeable and strategically 
located diaspora is in terms of its visible support for the LTTE, a fact that has rendered it an 
important and perhaps even a distinct party to the conflict.  Many of the recognisable 
overseas SLT organisations in North America, Europe and Australia are openly sympathetic 
to the LTTE.  Pro-LTTE organisations regularly host marches, meetings, sports events, and 
political-cultural functions attracting hundreds, and often thousands of supporters, and where 
there is often a thin dividing line between mobilisations on a social-cultural level, and those 
with overtly political overtones.  
 
Thus, at the same time as Indian support for the LTTE came to an end in 1987, and as the 
LTTE’s offices and support network in Tamil Nadu came under hostile scrutiny, an entirely 
separate network of sympathisers and activists was crystallising in numerous cities 
worldwide.  Through the 1990s, outside of its military presence in the north-east of Sri 
Lanka, the LTTE’s presence was visible largely in terms of the location of its international 
offices in London and Paris,
48 its international lobbying campaign with national governments 
and at United Nations NGO meetings, and its “mass” presence at regular public rallies and 
demonstrations held in cities across the world from Toronto to Melbourne.  LTTE 
sympathisers have operated a persistent and sophisticated media network disseminating news 
and views over at least a dozen pro-LTTE websites, several radio stations, a Tamil cable 
television network, numerous publications in Tamil and English, and consistent lobbying 
with national governments, international organizations (UN human rights and minority rights 
fora), and with international NGO solidarity networks.  
 
This is not to suggest a simplistic conflation of the SLT diaspora with the LTTE as there 
exists considerable diversity within diaspora communities in terms of political sympathies 
and even in terms of predisposition towards politics at all.  The available ethnographic 
evidence indicates that the political, cultural and social space that the LTTE occupies 
parallels the marginalisation of diaspora communities from these very spaces abroad due to 
their vulnerable existence as national minorities or asylum-seekers.  In one case study, the 
author comments on a public event organised by a pro-LTTE organisation as follows:  
 
the majority of people present at this latter festival are normally not what I would 
call 'LTTE-people' but people by whom the historical consciousness of this 




But nevertheless, the SLT diaspora has undeniably emerged since the late-1980s as the most 
important and visible constituency of support for the LTTE.  The reasons for this are not 
difficult to understand - Sri Lanka’s domestic Tamil population consist either of those living 
under great insecurity in the war-torn north-east, (often as internal refugees), and those living 
as a minority in the south, (often under heightened surveillance).  Under these circumstances, 
the diaspora occupies a unique space with respect to the conflict, and in the absence of a 
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peace process during the 1990s has formed the only available locus of open political activity 
for the LTTE.  
 
The LTTE-Diaspora Nexus: It is widely alleged that the LTTE uses its international support 
network embedded within the SLT diaspora for three specific functions: fund-raising, arms 
procurement and international advocacy.  The involvement of the LTTE’s international 
network in these activities has received wide press coverage internationally since the mid-
1990s,
50 and has led the Sri Lankan conflict to be dubbed a “diaspora-funded war”.  Not 
surprisingly, disrupting the LTTE-diaspora nexus has subsequently become the central 
preoccupation of Sri Lankan foreign policy in the 1990s.   In addition, recent reports from the 
media and intelligence establishment suggest that the LTTE operates a number of businesses 
around the world that it uses to raise and channel resources.  These are said to include a deep-
water shipping fleet,
51 and even a business empire in construction, real estate investments, 
jewellery shops, international money transfers, cable television, and telecommunications.
52  
The LTTE is also said to have established a clandestine presence in a number of south-east 
Asian countries, particularly in Thailand and Myanmar, for logistics, procurement and trans-
shipment points to Sri Lanka.
53   
 
While the scale and nature of the LTTE’s international advocacy campaign can be more 
easily verified, the inherently clandestine nature of the business investments, arms 
procurement and fund-raising functions has meant that there is actually little beyond 
anecdotal or circumstantial evidence of these activities publicly available.  What little exists 
is often speculative or attributed to national intelligence or police agencies in the context of 
their attempts to characterise the LTTE’s international network as an international terrorist 
threat. 
 
For example, a report published by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service alleges that:  
 
The majority of financial support comes from six main areas, all of which contain 




The US State Department says: 
 
The LTTE also uses its international contacts to procure weapons, 
communications, and any other equipment and supplies it needs. The LTTE 
exploits large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain 
funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka.
55 
 
Meanwhile, Gunaratna (2000), who writes as an expert on international terrorism, says: 
 
About 80% of the LTTE annual budget, estimated at $82 million, is generated 
from diaspora contributions and revenue from international trade, enterprise and 
investments. 
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This is not to dismiss the existence of such a link between the diaspora and the LTTE, which 
the LTTE itself readily admits to.
56  Indeed, the diaspora-funding link plausibly exists simply 
by the fact of the considerable economic significance of overseas SLTs, (which is estimated 
at 5-10 percent of Sri Lanka’s GDP)
57 and the extent to which they contain a sizeable element 
that is clearly pro-LTTE.  But it is important to recognise that the most interesting inferences 
that can be drawn from the recent exposes of the LTTE-diaspora nexus lie not just in the raw 
content of the scarce and often partial information publicly available, but in terms of the 
global context, the political identities and the strategic compulsions of those seeking to 
publicise such information. 
 
International Advocacy: During the 1980s, external diplomatic advocacy for the Sri Lankan 
Tamil cause took place at one level through international NGO networks, as it fit in within 
existing preoccupations over human rights, minority rights and conflict.  But at the same 
time, the most important diplomatic interventions took place at the official level, primarily 
through the Indian government, Indian diplomatic missions and Indian delegates to 
international state-level meetings such the UN Commission on Human Rights and the 
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.  But such 
support from India at the official level ended in the late-1980s, leaving the Tamil Eelam 
movement without official diplomatic patrons.  In this vacuum, the focus of the LTTE’s 
international advocacy has fallen back on the unofficial or NGO level, which by the early 
1990s, had been accorded a new space and legitimacy within international policy. 
 
The elevation of NGOs to the centre of the international policy debate on social issues in the 
1990s is signified in the high profile role they have played in the deliberations of United 
Nations conferences on the environment (1992), human rights (1993), population (1994), 
social development (1995), women (1995), habitat (1996), and racism (2001).   This is 
evident for example in the way most UN and multilateral conferences now result in two 
separate declarations: an official document negotiated by the state-entities, and a parallel 
“NGO declaration” that is intended to counter the perceived conservatism and inadequacy of 
the official declarations. 
 
The rapid incorporation of this often nebulously defined category of NGOs within 
international deliberations in the 1990s has provided a legitimate avenue for non-state entities 
to gain a foothold (albeit a marginal one) within the realm of international diplomacy, which 
had previously been monopolised entirely by internationally recognised state entities.  As 
such, the changing external dimensions of the conflict in Sri Lanka are also reflected in the 
transformation of the inter-state diplomatic confrontation in the 1980s between India and Sri 
Lanka into a new confrontation between Sri Lanka in the official forum, and pro-Eelam 
activists in the NGO forum.
58   
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This new configuration was evident, for example, in the September 2001 World Conference 
Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa.  The Sri Lankan government delegate, 
participating in the official plenary session of the WCAR, made a remark apparently in an 
oblique reference to the LTTE, attempting to locate the group within the preoccupations of 
the conference: 
 
In my country extremist groups often use tribalistic rhetoric ostensibly to achieve 
communal aspirations and some engage in violence and terror.
59 
 
Meanwhile, the alternative NGO declaration from the same conference acknowledges a 
considerably different reality in Sri Lanka: 
 
…Acknowledging 50 years of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka which has resulted in 
death, disappearances, rape, torture and destruction and affirming the right to 




International Diplomacy: The replacement of Tamil Nadu by the SLT diaspora as the most 
important political constituency of external support for the Tamil Eelam movement has meant 
that the external political dimensions of the conflict have effectively expanded from a 
regional to an international context.  Alongside this, there has been a parallel shift in the 
diplomatic efforts of the Sri Lankan government, from one that centred around lobbying cold 
war allies in opposition to India, to one that centres around lobbying post-cold war allies to 
disrupt Tamil diaspora activism and the LTTE’s international network. 
 
While Sri Lanka’s efforts in the 1980s were largely unsuccessful, those of the 1990s were 
more so, because of two key reasons.  Firstly, in the 1990s, Sri Lanka did not encounter any 
counter-lobbying at the state-level.  Despite the fact that the LTTE mounts a persistent and 
well-resourced NGO campaign, and benefits from strong organisational networks at 
important centres of international diplomacy such as Geneva, London and Paris, they are 
completely unrepresented and have no advocates within state-level institutions such as the 
UN General Assembly, or the UN Commission on Human Rights.  They do not enjoy any 
measure of diplomatic patronage by a state, and no state has put the kind of hostile pressure 
on Sri Lanka in the 1990s in the way that India did during the 1980s.   
 
Secondly, Sri Lanka’s anti-LTTE diplomacy internationally has coincided with the growing 
spectre of international terrorism that has arisen independently in countries where the Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora is resident.  International terrorism had been nominated well before 
the events of September 11, 2001 as a global security threat of a magnitude that could replace 
the position previously accorded by the western powers to international communism.  By 
December 1994, the nature of the new post-cold-war era consensus on this issue was 
signified in the landmark UNGA resolution 49/60, “Measures to eliminate international 
terrorism”.
61  
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In Sri Lanka, the repercussions of this emerging global paradigm have been evident in the 
way that from the mid-1990s onwards, the government has successfully registered the LTTE 
within the pantheon of international terrorist organisations, thus gaining powerful new allies 
and new avenues of legitimacy in the prosecution of an old war.  The first tangible signs of 
this new alliance emerged in 1994 when the US resumed arms sales to Sri Lanka.  In the 
backdrop of an increasingly anti-LTTE rhetorical posture by the Clinton administration, 
media reports revealed in 1996 that the elite US “Green Beret” corps were providing 
advanced training to the Sri Lankan security forces, albeit in camps located far from the 
actual conflict zone.
62  Since then, US military support for the government is reported to have 
expanded to include training missions by other highly specialised units such as the US Navy 
SEALs, the US Air Force Special Operations Squadron, and even the US Army’s 
Psychological Operations or “Psy-Ops” Group.
63   
 
In October 1997, this re-internationalisation of the Sri Lankan conflict under new aegis was 
signified most vividly when the US State Department designated the LTTE as a “foreign 
terrorist organisation” under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the 
“Oklahoma City Law”) of 1996.
64  The provisions of the US terrorist designation ban fund-
raising and other tangible support for the LTTE from the US, and block any existing funds of 
the organisation held at US financial institutions.  But beyond this, the indirect implications 
of the US ban have been in terms of the way it has delegitimised the LTTE’s cause 
internationally, and has been the basis upon which a number of other states have placed the 
LTTE’s activities under greater surveillance. 
 
Exactly one week after the US terrorist designation, a powerful bomb explosion occurred in 
Colombo, perhaps by coincidence in front of the very hotel where a recently arrived US 
military mission was lodged.  Although the LTTE has never claimed responsibility for the 
bombing (and none of the military personnel were actually injured), it was widely interpreted 
as an expression of their severe displeasure at the greater US political and military 
involvement in the conflict.  This interpretation gained credence when the US military 
mission was abruptly withdrawn after the bombing, following which all US training exercises 
in Sri Lanka were temporarily suspended.
65 
 
In April 2001, a second, and potentially more influential international intervention into the 
war occurred when Britain proscribed the LTTE under sweeping anti-terrorism legislation 
with provisions more restrictive than those of the 1997 US ban.  As the former colonial 
power and home to the LTTE’s international headquarters, Britain’s decision to proscribe the 
LTTE was arguably the most significant external political intervention into the conflict in the 
post-1990 period.  In the months before the proscription order between December 2000 - 
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February 2001, the pending, but yet unannounced British decision on whether the LTTE 
would be proscribed briefly became the most important and carefully followed political issue 
in Sri Lanka.  In a process that became emblematic of the internationalisation of the conflict, 
an extraordinary lobbying effort came underway by both sides across the island and 
internationally, directed at the UK Home Office and the then Home Minister, Jack Straw.
66   
 
On the one side, the LTTE, pro-LTTE organisations, Tamil (non-LTTE) political parties in 
Sri Lanka, and numerous overseas SLT organisations campaigned vigorously against 
proscription.  There were numerous demonstrations and petitions organised from more 
obscure parts of the north-east to Colombo, London and Toronto, all directed at the British 
Home Office.
67  On the other side, the Sri Lankan government and Sinhala nationalist 
organisations such as the Sinhala Urumaya (SU) demanded that the LTTE be included in the 
proscribed list, with similar petition campaigns organised in Sri Lanka and abroad to this 
effect.  At an official level, there was intense diplomatic pressure by Sri Lanka on the British 
government, including a number of high-profile visits by officials such as foreign minister 
Lakshman Kadirgamar, who used the strongest diplomatic language to convey that Britain’s 
failure to proscribe the LTTE would be interpreted as “an unfriendly act that would impose a 
considerable strain on our relations”.
68  Furthermore, in a move that symbolised the extent to 
which India’s position vis-à-vis Sri Lanka had been transformed since the 1980s, New Delhi 
is understood to have applied quiet diplomatic pressure on Britain in favour of the LTTE’s 
proscription.
69   
 
As a result of the proscription, the LTTE’s international offices based in London and Paris 
were closed down.  It is illegal under British law to be a member of the LTTE, to support it 
through financial or other means, to speak in its favour or otherwise “encourage support”, to 
attend meetings where members of the organisation speak, or to wear or display emblems 
associated with the organisation.
70  In addition, the apparent extra-territorial repercussions of 
these provisions means that it has rendered the LTTE’s overseas network (i.e., not just that in 
Britain) illegal in toto under British law. 
 
“Crouching Tiger, Hidden War”
71: The internationalisation of the conflict in this manner has 
made global perceptions and images of the war a potentially serious factor in affecting its 
outcome.
72  Consequently, both sides have come to pay closer attention to managing the 
external media coverage of the war, and have even accused each other of playing to the 
international media gallery.  In February 2001, for example, the government dismissed the 
LTTE’s unilateral cease-fire as a public relations ploy to improve its international image and 
to avoid being proscribed by the UK.
73  Meanwhile, an LTTE press release at the time of the 
1995 negotiations speculated that the new government’s peace initiative was part of a 
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duplicitous strategy to “supply sunshine stories to the outside world”
74 in order to win more 
aid commitments. 
 
One of the most striking features of the international media coverage of the war has been a 
considerable transformation in international media sympathies towards the protagonists that 
is evident from the contrast between their coverage of events in the early-1980s and late-
1990s.  In the aftermath of wide media coverage of the anti-Tamil riots in 1983 and the 
subsequent refugee exodus, there was a wave of international media sympathy for the Tamils, 
and a demonisation of the Sri Lankan state in international opinion.  Gunaratna (1997) notes: 
 
Mid-1983 to mid-1987 witnessed Sri Lanka’s international image at its lowest 
ebb.  Despite having an open economy, a model democracy and a major tourist 
destination, Sri Lanka’s international image suffered irreversibly.  TULF 
propaganda branded Sri Lanka as a state guilty of discrimination and 
perpetrating genocide against its minority. 
 
In contrast, international media coverage in the 1990s, and particularly after 1995, helped to 
rehabilitate the Sri Lankan state and to demonise the LTTE, which was accused of 
assassinating two heads of states, unilaterally breaking a cease-fire in 1995, conducting a 
suicide bombing campaign that claimed numerous civilian lives in 1996-97, and recruiting 
child soldiers.
75  By association, Sri Lankan Tamils overseas have themselves come to be 
castigated as a dangerous and devious diaspora
76 – a community that is said to fund 




The emerging perceptions of the civil war in the late-1990s in the context of the gathering 
international hostility to the LTTE were summarised as follows by an international NGO co-
ordinator in Colombo: 
 
The LTTE are perceived as the aggressors, who unilaterally broke off the peace 
negotiations. The LTTE is seen as a formidable military or terrorist organisation 
which lacks the political maturity to convert its military successes into realistic 
political concessions on regional autonomy… 
 
By contrast the [current Sri Lankan government] People's Alliance Government 
led by President Chandrika Kumaratunga is seen as a reforming government 
which came to power committed to a programme of introducing constitutional 
reform, strengthening human rights safeguards, and negotiating a peaceful 
solution to the ethnic conflict. For the past two years international observers have 
continued with this assessment despite the government's failure to implement any 
of the promised reforms. 
78 
 
A significant aspect of the recent international media coverage of the war has been the 
absence of what is known as the “CNN effect”.  At a time when graphic satellite television 
images of remote and exotic wars are increasingly commonplace, and are becoming 
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instrumental in manipulating global public opinion, it is of interest to note that there are 
simply no such images available from the north-east of Sri Lanka.   
 
Between 1996-2000, the war had escalated to an unprecedented extent with several major 
military confrontations in the north-east (Operations Riviresa, Jaya Sikuru, Oyatha-Alaigal), 
that resulted in thousands of military and civilians lives lost.  Throughout the 1990s, a large 
proportion of the population of the north-east lived as internal refugees under conditions of 
grave physical and economic insecurity and subject to worsening incidence of malnutrition 
and disease.  But there is virtually no visual record of this reality lodged in the global public 
consciousness, and consequently, diminished international public attention or political 
pressure to address or ameliorate it.  In part, this is because of the tight government 
censorship and travel restrictions that placed the north-east out of bounds for both domestic 
or foreign journalists between 1996-2001.  In contrast, there was been considerably more 
prominent international television and print coverage of the devastating bomb attacks in 
Colombo during 1996-97, the Dalada Maligawa (Temple of the Tooth) in Kandy in 1998, and 
Katunayake airport in 2001, all of which contributed towards the characterisation of the 
LTTE internationally as a ruthless terrorist organisation. 
  
 
War and Dualism  
In economic terms, the two decades of conflict in Sri Lanka in the 1980s and 1990s have 
paradoxically been a time of strong economic growth and structural transformation.  
Throughout the war period, governments from different political parties continued to 
implement economic reforms with relative normality while promoting a relatively successful 
export-driven industrialisation process.  Compared to other conflict-ridden countries where 
the disruptions due to war have resulted in negative growth rates and the destruction of the 




Despite the fact that the war in Sri Lanka is routinely cited in economic analyses as a drag on 
the economy, and as a source of diminished economic growth, a review of economic statistics 
would suggest the opposite.  During the first 15 years of war between 1983-98, real GDP 
growth averaged 4.6 percent annually while exports multiplied almost three-fold in real 
terms.
80  In the late-1970s, tea and rubber accounted for over 70 percent of all exports, but by 
the mid-1990s, this had reversed to the extent that it is manufactured goods (largely 
garments) that now account for over 70 percent of exports.
81  Similarly, the “open economy” 
policy of market reforms and privatisation which began in 1977 also continued to unfold and 
expand through the war, proving resilient and even gaining in momentum through periods of 
economic, political and military crisis. 
 
Furthermore, in a comparative study of the economic and social consequences of civil war in 
seven countries, Fitzgerald, Stewart and Wang (2001) note that Sri Lanka is unique not just in 
having experienced economic growth amid war, but in economic growth rates that exceeded 
the pre-war period, and remark that “the limited spread of violence does not explain why 
growth actually increased during the war”.
82   
 
                                                 
79 See Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001), particularly the comparative studies in volume 1. 
80 World Bank World Development Indicators 2001 CD ROM. 
81 UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2000 CD ROM. 
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This curious paradox of relentless economic growth amid relentless destruction can be 
explained on the one hand in terms of the physical separation of the dynamics of the two 
processes.  In geographical terms, the locus of destruction in the north-east is almost perfectly 
segregated from the locus of economic growth in the south-west.  Although the south has 
been quite seriously affected by the war, most vividly through the numerous suicide 
bombings and assassinations, it bears little comparison to the scale, intensity and duration of 
human suffering and economic dislocation in the north.  In essence, the war has largely been 
confined to the island’s most peripheral economic spaces, leaving virtually all the important 
sources of linkage to the global economy, such as the export-processing zones, tea 
plantations, tourist resorts, and workers remittances remarkably well insulated from its direct 
effects.
83  This situation helped to promote economic normalcy and political stability in the 
south, and has provided the government with a steady and growing fiscal base with which to 
fund its rapidly escalating military budget.   
 
But it is also possible to posit an alternate hypothesis on the relationship between war, 
reforms and economic growth that explains their prolonged temporal coincidence as arising 
not from their separation as such, but from some form of functional inter-dependence.  Earlier 
work such as Gunasinghe (1984) sought to frame such links in terms of the impact of onset of 
market liberalisation in 1977 upon the subsequent outbreak of the war in 1983.  However, 
there are grounds to suggest an alternate, but little explored direction of causality in terms of 
the functionality of the war for the economic reform process.  In other words, the prolonged 
and deadlocked conflict in the north has in different ways been an enabling factor for the 
much contested economic reform process in the south. 
 
There are several mechanisms by which this may have operated.  First, the social dislocations 
and disturbances emanating from the reform process were diffused in that they were earlier 
directed in the form of violence against the Tamil minority, and later institutionalised into the 
civil war.  Secondly, the war has in perverse ways cushioned the effects of the reforms, partly 
because of the domestic multiplier effects of the rising military budget.  It resulted for 
example in the rapid expansion of employment opportunities in the security sector, which by 
2001 accounted for over five percent of total employment and a much higher percentage of 
formal sector employment.  Thirdly, the increased militarisation of the state under war-time 
conditions has provided the government with greater authoritarian powers to counter any 
serious threat of political disturbances.  In addition, the heightened sense of Tamil-Sinhala 
hostility fuelled by the war has provided successive governments with an alternative basis for 
national unity (at least in the south) to counter the considerable political polarisation 
emerging around the issue of economic reforms.   
 
The functionalist nature of this hypothesis may render it open to criticism that it is ahistorical, 
or that while it highlights the inter-dependence of different elements in a static equilibrium, it 
cannot be extrapolated temporally to explain the origins or subsequent evolution of these very 
elements.  It is not suggested here that Sri Lanka’s ruling elites somehow started the war in 
order to mask their reform agenda, or even that their quest for a peaceful solution to the 
conflict signifies the end of the reforms.  Indeed, the peace initiative that has advanced since 
December 2001 has occurred at a time when the reform process has been placed on an 
                                                 
83 The tourist industry however, has been very vulnerable to any news of the acceleration of the war or to 
instances of urban bombings.  What is remarkable though is not the disruptions to the tourist industry caused by 
the war, but the very fact that a sizeable tourism industry exists at all, with most beach resorts just 200 kms 
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entirely self-sustaining basis that can survive any threat of disruption due to peace.
84  The 
mounting military cost of the war (which exceeded 20 percent of the total budget in 2000), 
has contributed to this and become a powerful factor for accelerating the economic reforms, 
as they have forced the government to seek relief packages from the IMF that are laden with 
tight, time-bound conditionalities on implementing reforms. 
 
Rather the purpose here is to suggest that the parallel trajectories of war and economic 
reforms, the two most important factors behind the transformation of Sri Lanka in the 1980s 
and 1990s cannot be viewed as contradictory or even detached, but closely related, and even 
symbiotic.  This relationship between reforms and conflict can be viewed as an extrapolation 




4. Conclusions    
In December 2001, the election victory of the UNP under Ranil Wickremasinghe brought 
about the conditions for a cease-fire and subsequently for peace talks aimed at a political 
settlement.  With the cease-fire having been in operation for the entire year 2002, and the 
announcement of substantial progress in the face-to-face negotiations held under Norwegian 
mediation since September 2002, there is unprecedented optimism that some resolution will 
finally be found to the conflict.  The distinct possibility that the Sri Lankan civil war has 
actually come to an end has provided a unique opportunity to revisit many of its aspects, and 
to study it and analyse its causes and consequences its consequences in historical context.   
 
This paper has attempted to construct such a context by embedding the trajectory of the 
political conflict and civil war within changing historical and global circumstances.  Most 
importantly, the underlying dynamics of the conflict have been traced here to the larger 
changes that have taken place in the Sri Lankan economy and its relationship to the global 
economy.  Despite claims to its ancient origins, the Tamil-Sinhala political conflict is an 
utterly modern one, and arose at a very specific moment in the island’s economic history in 
the late-1950s at a time of rapid social, economic and demographic change.  It similarly 
escalated into civil war at another crucial point of economic transition in 1977-83.  Since 
then, the economy has undergone important structural transformations, often of a 
controversial nature during an extended period of civil war and displacement.  Viewed 
together, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, through its many phases from 1956-2001 has been 
integrally linked to the changing integration of Sri Lanka into the global economy.  The 
social repercussions and tensions arising in the context of this integration have been manifest 
and taken shape through the prism of domestic and international politics.  In this paper, these 
have been viewed in terms of their temporal intersection with changing regional and global 
power interests, and to the making and unmaking of cross-border geographies of political 





                                                 
84 The mounting military expenditures (which exceeded 20 percent of the total budget in 2000), have led Sri 
Lanka in 2001 to its first period of economic contraction in the entire post-colonial period.  This has in itself 
become a powerful factor for hastening the reforms, as they have forced the government to seek relief packages 
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